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Introduction
It is an unfortunate, but undeniable, fact that unnecessary deaths occur in hospitals throughout the world. In the UK, the reporting of Robert Francis' Report of the public inquiry into the medical care within the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust (UK Department of Health, 2013) , has led to close examination of hospital mortality rates. Elevated mortality rates were a key indicator in the eventual identification of the failing standards of care in this trust. Standardised mortality ratios provide a crude, but objective and important measure of care quality.
An important question this inquiry has raised is how the hospital trust and its clinicians could largely disregard consistently high mortality.
Due to the fallibility of clinicians and the structures in which they work, preventable errors, morbidity and eventually mortality occur. The extent to which this happens is debatable. The Chief Medical Officer estimates that in the UK, 255,000 patients suffer disability, serious harm or death each year as a result of healthcare interventions (UK Department of Health, 2000) . Yet iatrogenic harm is not always considered preventable. Operations such as elective aortic aneurysm repair have a recognised mortality rate, and death after such an operation would not summarily be regarded as preventable.
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Methods
The trust comprises of three acute hospitals providing medical care to a population of around half a million and a specialist cancer centre serving a population of over one million. The trust sees 130,000 A&E attendances, and 71,500 elective and emergency admissions a year to over 800 inpatient beds.
The average stay for emergency admissions is 5.5 days, and for elective admissions is 2.8 days.
The Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio for our trust was 102.1 and 99.5 during the study period (NHS mean is 100). This indicates that our institution sees approximately the expected amount of inpatient mortality. This makes our trust a representative centre when assessing care quality, particularly from a perspective of patient mortality.
We audited mortality in our trust in an effort to identify areas in which care quality could be improved. Neonatal patients were excluded. As part of this audit, we used a modified Likert scale to ask clinicians whether they thought the death was preventable. The available responses were a) not preventable were completed by consultants, and 15.1% by registrars.
The average patient age at the time of death was 81.8 years (range 0.75 -105 years). 46.6% were male, and 53.4% female. The most common causes of death were pneumonia / aspiration pneumonia accounting for 201 cases, sepsis accounting for 128, progression of cancer accounting for 151, and ischaemic heart disease accounting for 106. The patients were predominantly under the care of medical specialties, with 375 under care of the elderly, 174 acute medicine, and 108 respiratory medicine. Deaths were evenly spaced over the course of the day, and were more prevalent in winter. There were no statistically significant variations in the distribution of deaths over the course of the week (see Table I ).
Insert table I
54% of patients that died were, at the time of death, being cared for in accordance to the LCP. These deaths were therefore considered expected.
The relatively high proportion of these patients reflects the presence in the trust of a large cancer centre with inpatient palliative care. The remaining 447 were classed as unexpected and were investigated further.
When asked their perception on the probability of survival with optimal management / the preventability of the death, of those that answered, 21% either responded as no idea, or did not respond at all. Of the 79% of responses, 93.3% felt the death was not preventable, 5% unlikely to be When asked about the standard of care and areas for improvement, in 77.3%
of cases, the auditor felt good practice had been followed. 13.3% of the time, there were areas of clinical care with room to improve on, in 6.0% of cases this applied to organisational care, and in 2.7% of cases, this applied to both.
In only 0.7% of cases did the auditor feel that care was less than satisfactory.
This compares with the NCEPOD study of 2195 deaths, in which 60.9% of cases were adjudged to have received good clinical care, 34.2% had room for improvement, and 4.9% was less than satisfactory. The differences in the values for good clinical care and less than satisfactory care are also significant (p<0.0001, Fisher's exact test) (see Table II ).
Insert Table II Interestingly, when considering individual specified parameters, failings in quality of care were more frequently identified. In 8.4% of cases, the auditor identified avoidable delays in management, 3.3% of cardiac arrests were not considered to be managed according to best practice, 0.5% identified a medication error, 4.1% an avoidable complication, and 2.6% identified unavailability of equipment or resources that contributed to a deterioration in the patient's condition. This study highlights a major disparity between widely accepted levels of preventable death, as assessed by retrospective case note review applied by trained reviewers, and clinician's perspective of the preventability of death.
Discussion
There are a number of possible reasons for this disparity:
1. An unusually low level of preventable death during the study period. 4. An 'objectivity gap' where clinicians who have treated patients are unable to perceive deficits in the quality of care.
Unusually low preventable mortality
The first possibility is that the trust has an unusually low level of preventable death. This seems highly unlikely. The HSMR of around 100 indicates that the trust sees the expected level of mortality (as adjusted by diagnosis and comorbidity), not a lower level than the NHS average. Furthermore, with the exception of a large cancer centre, the trust has a relatively 'normal' mix of acute services. In addition, the causes of death correlate well with national figures. The study included a sufficient number of cases to make random variation unlikely. These factors all make it highly unlikely that the trust has an abnormally low level of preventable death. 
A 'knowledge gap'
Of the two more likely possibilities, the first is that the disparity is due to the 'knowledge gap' between someone reviewing a set of notes retrospectively, and a clinician looking after a patient. 'Retrospective case note review' is the most commonly used tool in assessing preventability of death. However, whilst they are specifically trained, independent and disinterested, reviewers will not be able to gain the insight and depth of knowledge about a case as a treating clinician. Case notes are not an entirely comprehensive record of all examination findings, clinical impressions and medical care. Medical records are rarely 'complete' -even in a conventional sense. A large NICE audit of 1000 patients found that more than half of clinical entries were not timed, and a third of clinical reviews were not recorded (NICE, 2015) . But more importantly, even when records are complete in a conventional sense -they do not adequately encapsulate the impression a clinician forms when they review a patient. This impression might be a number of complex thoughts (Hamilton et al, 2015) . Whilst technology such as electronic records may address some of these issues, it is likely that a 'knowledge gap' will persist in the foreseeable future.
This 'knowledge gap' has implications for the process of retrospective case note review. It has already been noted (Lilford et al., 2007) , that there is limited inter-observer reliability in independent retrospective review studies, which further limits their utility -despite the fact that they are so commonly used. McDonald et al. (2000) also argue that these studies lead to overestimates of preventable mortality, as the structured questionnaire may tend to emphasize deficits in care quality, and thus preventability is assumed, when mortality may, in fact, be inevitable. Hayward et al. (2001) further points out that deficits in care do not inevitably lead to mortality, but rather increase the probability of mortality. In these cases, determining when a death is 'preventable', or simply 'deferrable' by a period of 1-2 months becomes challenging. This raises the question of the objectivity of external reviewers.
When historians consider 'counterfactual' history, an accepted premise is made that events will tend to revert to the situation that eventuated (Cowley, 2003) . If we approached retrospective case note review with the same premise, it is likely that we would find a much lower proportion of 'preventable' Hayward et al .(2001) showed these variations, they were unable to suggest a better tool to judge the adequacy of an individual's care. They suggest that the identification of patterns is crucial to improving quality.
Because only patients that die are included in these studies, reviewers may have a skewed perspective of the outcome or significance of minor errors.
Even when all facts are known and debated at length, it is hard to know what 'proportion' of the mortality is caused by the error -notable legal cases considering causality highlight this problem (Clark & Nolan, 2014) . Further, even when care is 'optimal', if the patient's prognosis is measured in weeks, then the implication of 'preventable' mortality change.
An 'objectivity gap'
Lastly, it is possible that clinicians do not have an objective view of the preventability of deaths of patients under their care. It may be that when a patient dies, they are reluctant to accept that were it not for the actions of their team and the nature of the hospital environment in which they work, the patient may otherwise have survived. This could be termed an 'objectivity gap'. The implicit recognition of an 'objectivity gap' seen in other approaches to determining the preventability of mortality (Hogan et al, 2012) gives weight to this possibility. Clearly, as aluded to above, independent retrospective case note review is not completely objective. Being advised to look through a set of notes looking for 'preventable' mortality may colour an individual's approach. Indeed, in Hogan's later paper on preventable mortality (Hogan et al, 2015) , a reduction in 'preventable' mortality of 40% (from 5.2% to 3.0%) was predominantly ascribed to reviewer objectivity factors -such as awareness of 'do not resuscitate' orders, the wording of the questions in the proforma, and cultural changes to do with criticism of clinicians. Hogan et al acknowledge that meaningful measures on the proportion of preventable deaths might be made difficult by their rarity, and consequent low 'signal to noise' ratio of preventable death within all mortality. Despite these acknowledged weaknesses to this process, the UK still intends to use this tool to improve acute care quality (NHS England, 2016 ).
This 'objectivity gap' nevertheless gives insights into how substandard care provided by institutions can be overlooked by clinicians working in those institutions. For example, a clinician, used to waiting for imaging, may view a delay of three hours for a scan as standard, and thus acceptable; whereas as independent reviewer may highlight this as an unacceptable cause of preventable death. This may partially explain high profile patient care scandals (UK Department of Health, 2013). It may also mean that clinicians working within a given setting, with its systemic constraints, are not best placed to monitor outcomes from that setting to which they are accustomed. This likely 'objectivity gap' has significant implications for quality assurance of services that rely on individuals analyzing and assessing their own outcomes.
If an individual is unable to be objective about the quality of care they are providing, then it is essential that institutions routinely utilize independent assessors to conduct clinical governance. There are clearly acknowledged issues with independent case note review. Enrollment in national audit processes can also provide more objective measures of care quality, and should be encouraged, or even made mandatory. Clearly such audit processes require adequate administrative support, but the potential quality improvement makes this likely to be worthwhile. Variations in outcome data should then be thoroughly investigated.
This study does highlight the importance of the design of such investigations.
Retrospective investigations are limited by the availability of data, and the quality of data available (as discussed above). Whilst it is likely that over time the quality of clinical records will improve -as technological and cultural changes improve recording mechanism -there will still be a 'knowledge gap' between those caring for patients and external assessors. Prospective studies may be affected by intrinsic bias associated with changes to practice induced by the presence of an assessor. The use of patient reported measures has been suggested by Varagunam et al. (2015) , but is itself both subjective and subject to bias. Outcomes such as mortality are probably most appropriate for investigation -they are reliably recorded, and categorical. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 and while some of these variations can be mitigated against, using statistical tools and analysis, such steps introduce their own bias. It has been questioned why hospital-wide mortality indices can vary by as much as 80% between hospitals, despite most studies suggesting that only about 5% of inpatient mortality is 'preventable' (Nash & Quinn, 2013) . Furthermore, whilst hospital-wide measures certainly have an impact on patient care, the majority Furthermore, data such as mortality, as mentioned above, is already routinely collected -and in depth analysis has shown such datasets identify the vast majority of patient care (Westaby et al, 2007) . Departmental variations in mortality have been shown (Nouraei et al, 2013) , and the routine analysis of this data has been suggested as the most practical and objective way of monitoring outcomes (Nouraei et al, 2016) .
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Summary
Certainly it is possible, and even likely, that a combination of these factors may have caused our results. This is important because it indicates that part of the reduced level of 'preventable' mortality that we saw in our study may be a true representation of what is 'preventable'. This has also been suggested by Hayward & Hofer (2001) . It is for this reason that it has been suggested that as we seek to reduce mortality and explain the variations in mortality between different institutions, factors other than independently assessed 'preventability' should be considered (Nash & Quinn, 2013) . There is a wide disparity between independent case note review and clinicians assessing the care of their own patients. This may be due to a 'knowledge gap' between reviewers and treating clinicians, an 'objectivity gap' meaning clinicians may not recognize preventability of death of patients under their care, or a combination of these factors.
Conclusions
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